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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the conclusion of a federal jury trial, a unique tension
exists between the notion of a “fair verdict” and the American legal
system’s historical veneration of private jury deliberations. When a
litigant alleges that a fair trial was denied after jury deliberations have
concluded, the resolution of this allegation directly conflicts with the
systemic interest in verdict finality. Few would deny that a losing
litigant deserves a new trial if the jury’s verdict was tainted by
something external to the protections of the courtroom. 1 Conversely, it
is well-recognized that, unlike fine wine, steaks, and cheese, lawsuits
do not improve with age because as time passes, memories fade,

∗ J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. Special thank you to both my wife, Lizzie—I am nothing without
you—and to my son, Owen—you inspire me every day. I love you both more than
you will ever know!
1
James W. Diehm, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts: Tanner v. United States and
Beyond, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 389, 403 (1991) (noting that external influences
would include: threats against jurors, outside or erroneous information provided to
jurors, or other improper influences). See, e.g., Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Gereau,
523 F.2d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 1975) (jurors learned extra-record facts about the case not
introduced during trial).
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witnesses become unavailable, and evidence is often lost. 2 The final
result may not be a fair verdict, because it may have more to do with
the good fortune of a party in obtaining evidence for the second trial
rather than the actual merits of the case. 3 Accordingly, society has a
substantial interest in assuring that judicial verdicts, at some point, are
viewed as final. 4
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) 5 attempts to mediate between
these interests by recognizing the importance of verdict finality, but it
also recognizes that due process 6 may trump verdict finality. Rule
606(b) maintains the viability of the jury system because it
discourages the harassment of jurors by losing litigants, encourages
free and open discussion among jurors during deliberations, reduces
the incentive for jury tampering, and promotes verdict finality. 7 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently addressed Rule
2

Id. at 402 (1991).
Id. See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520-21 (1972) (discussing the
costs to society and litigants when trials become lengthy).
4
See infra Part II. B.
5
Federal Rule 606(b) states:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of
anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in
connection therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) whether
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to
the jury's attention, (2) whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether there
was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form. A
juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror may
not be received on a matter about which the juror would be
precluded from testifying.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
6
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be...deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process”).
7
United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 915 (3d Cir. 1996).
3
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606(b) in Arreola v. Choudry, 8 where the plaintiff alleged that he was
denied a fair trial, claiming that a juror’s past experience with ankle
injuries was “extraneous prejudicial information.” The court, however,
held that a juror’s internal knowledge of ankle injuries was not
extraneous prejudicial information, thus Rule 606(b) would not permit
juror testimony to impeach 9 the verdict. 10 Although the holding in this
case was correct, two issues concerning Rule 606(b) stem from this
decision. First, would the result have changed had this been a criminal
trial; in other words, does the Sixth Amendment 11 provide a sharper
blade to pierce the shield of Rule 606(b)? Second, and perhaps more
importantly, what qualifies as extraneous prejudicial information, how
do courts determine extraneous prejudicial information, and how
should courts proceed when extraneous prejudicial information was
present during deliberations?
The confusion underlying the divergent approaches to the
application of extraneous prejudicial information stems from the
ambiguous language of Rule 606(b), the Supreme Court’s limited and
unclear pronouncements regarding this language, and the Court’s
failure to specifically address what constitutes “extraneous prejudicial
information.” While the protections of Rule 606(b) are vital to the jury
system, an absolute prohibition of juror testimony could thwart one of
the fundamental purposes of a criminal jury trial. 12 Therefore, courts
throughout the Seventh Circuit need guidance as to what qualifies as
8

533 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 8576 (2008).
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (impeach, vb. 1. To charge
with a crime or misconduct; 2. To discredit the veracity of; 3. To challenge the
accuracy or authenticity of).
10
Arreola, 533 F.3d at 607.
11
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury…to be confronted
with the witnesses against him…and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.”).
12
See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965) (“The requirement that a
jury's verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial goes to the
fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by
jury.”) (internal quotations omitted).
9
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extraneous prejudicial information and how to proceed when
extraneous prejudicial information is alleged to have tainted the jury’s
verdict.
Accordingly, this article attempts to provide the needed guidance
on this important issue of jury impeachment, with a focus on criminal
trials. While Rule 606(b) contains three distinct exceptions, 13 this
article focuses on extraneous prejudicial information and its
application during criminal jury trials. This article begins with a brief
background of the common law prior to the enactment of Rule 606(b),
the legislative history of Rule 606(b), and the subsequent
interpretations thereof. 14 Next, it reviews the Seventh’s Circuit’s
recent application of Rule 606(b) in Arreola v. Choudry. Finally, it
provides guidance to the courts in addressing “extraneous prejudicial
information” and how courts should proceed when extraneous
prejudicial information has been alleged by a losing litigant.
II. IMPEACHMENT OF JURY VERDICTS AND FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 606(B)
A. The Tension Between a Criminal Defendant’s Rights
During Trial and the Policies of Rule 606(b)
A criminal defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury trial has
been deemed one of the most fundamental American rights. 15 Jurors
are chosen from the community at large and their verdicts are viewed
as credible because they reflect the values of their community and
13

See FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153,
211-29 (1989) (providing detailed explanation of the history of Rule 606(b)); Peter
N. Thompson, Challenge to the Decision Making Process—Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b) and the Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial, 38 SW. L.J. 1187,
1196-206 (1985) (same).
15
Robinson v. Polk, 444 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2006) (King, J., dissenting)
(“the right to an impartial jury stands among those most revered by the founding
generation.”).
14
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protect the accused against oppression by the government. 16 During a
criminal trial, jurors are expected to weigh the evidence and arguments
of counsel, assess the credibility of witnesses, listen to the instructions
given by the court, and deliberate in hopes of rendering a just
verdict. 17 Life experiences of jurors inevitably enter the jury room, 18
but the Sixth Amendment requires that jurors base their decisions
solely on the facts and law presented during the trial, thus preserving
the rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and counsel. 19 If
extraneous information swayed the jury’s verdict, 20 few would argue
that the losing party should be denied a new trial if it can be
unequivocally demonstrated that the verdict was tainted. 21
Although the jury system is not perfect, a complete sanitizing of
the jury room is impossible. 22 Jurors provide a vital public service in
exchange for little or no compensation. Indeed, Congress has
recognized the jury’s importance to our system of justice and has
16

See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (“the essential feature of a
jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the
commonsense judgment of…the community…that results from [the community’s]
determination of guilt or innocence.”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56
(1968) (noting that the purpose of the jury trial is to prevent oppression by the
Government).
17
See Diehm, supra note 1, at 394–95.
18
See J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“Jurors are not expected to come into the jury box and leave behind all
that their human experience has taught them. Individuals are not expected to ignore
as jurors what they know as [people]” internal citations omitted); Shillcutt v.
Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that human compassion is one
of the strengths of our jury system).
19
See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, (1961) (holding that the Impartial
Jury Clause "guarantees . . . a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.");
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965) (holding that the right of
confrontation requires that “the evidence…against a defendant shall come from the
witness stand …where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's rights.").
20
See Diehm, supra note 1, at 403-404.
21
See id. at 404. But see Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896)
(holding that a verdict of acquittal was final and could not be reviewed, on error or
otherwise, without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
22
United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1970).
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implemented other protection for jurors. 23 In order to safeguard the
jury system, society must protect the jury and the deliberation process
from outside scrutiny. 24 Accordingly, Rule 606(b) is designed not only
to protect jurors from being pestered by lawyers after the verdict is
rendered but also to protect the judicial process from efforts to
undermine a verdict. 25 By prohibiting jurors from testifying as to
matters which occurred during deliberations, Rule 606(b) discourages
almost all inquires into the jurors' deliberative process once a verdict is
rendered. 26
B. The Juror Impeachment Rule and Its Underlying Polices
Protection of jury deliberations originated with the common law
juror impeachment rule, which came from Lord Mansfield’s decision
in Vaise v. Delaval. 27 Under this rule, jurors were prohibited from
testifying as to any matter related to their deliberations. 28 The policy
behind the rigid Mansfield Rule was straightforward: if a juror was
engaged in wrongful conduct during deliberations, then his subsequent
testimony was considered untrustworthy. 29 Although this bright line
rule is considered harsh under today’s standards, courts continued to
apply this rule through most of the twentieth century. 30 While the rule
23

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1875(a) (2008) (providing that employers may not fire
an employee for serving as a juror).
24
See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 125 (1987) (expressing concern
whether the jury system could, in fact, survive if the deliberation process were
exposed to public scrutiny after the verdict was rendered).
25
Jong Hi Bek v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96284 (N.D. IL 2008).
26
See id.
27
99 ENG. REP. 944 (K.B. 1785).
28
Id.
29
Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of
Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusionary Principle of Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C. L.
REV. 509, 513-22 (1988).
30
See e.g. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915) (holding that jurors may
not testify that they reached their decision by averaging the individual jurors’
opinions on damages).
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remained the same, the modern justifications of jury secrecy moved
from juror credibility to more pragmatic and policy based reasons
which include: the finality of verdicts, protection of jurors, promotion
of full and frank deliberations, and the maintenance of the
community’s faith in juries and their verdicts. 31 These policies
supporting jury secrecy help justify Rule 606(b)’s prohibitions on
post-verdict juror testimony. 32 Therefore, a brief overview of the
changes in common law policy provide a proper context for Rule
606(b) analysis.
Courts and scholars have recognized that verdict finality is
important because, at some point, litigation has to end, and
communities must be able to rely on court decisions as final. 33 Thus,
preserving verdict finality outweighs the importance of uncovering
improper juror behavior in some instances, because destructive
uncertainty may develop if courts were viewed as indecisive or if
verdicts were impeached months or years after the litigation has
ended. 34 This is also consistent with the notion of a fair trial, because
if a verdict is impeached and the judgment set aside, it may be years
before the case is retried, which may not produce a just verdict. 35 If
the verdict is viewed as final, losing litigants will have little incentive
to threaten or harass jurors in order to elicit evidence that will impeach
the verdict. 36
31

See id. (noting that if “verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned” could
be attacked and set aside on the testimony jurors, jurors would be harassed by the
defeated party in an effort to set aside a verdict).
32
See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 618 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The
secrecy of deliberations is the cornerstone of the modern Anglo-American jury
system.”)
33
See Diehm, supra note 1, at 402.
34
See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120(1987) (“Allegations of juror
misconduct, incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks,
or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality of the process.”).
35
See Diehm, supra note 1, at 396. But see U.S. CONST. amend. V. (A jury
verdict of “not guilty” is final and may not be impeached under the fifth amendment
principles of double jeopardy).
36
See James W. Diehm, supra note 1, at 403.
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Impeachment based upon juror testimony would have a serious
chilling affect upon jury deliberations if they were exposed to public
scrutiny. 37 By preventing litigants from using juror testimony to
impeach a verdict, Rule 606(b) protects jurors from harassment by a
defeated party “in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts
which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.” 38
Without the restraints of Rule 606(b), members of the community may
be reluctant to serve as jurors if there is a possibility that their
comments will be made public, that they will be harassed after the
verdict, or that they will be called to testify on matters pertaining to
their jury service and deliberations. 39
Moreover, in order to achieve a just verdict, deliberations must
allow the jurors to speak freely so that all of the members of the jury
can be heard. 40 Freedom to deliberate in secret is thought to promote
good group dynamics within a jury, whereby jury members exchange
ideas and concerns to reach a verdict that reflects community morals. 41
37

McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915) (holding that if evidence
from juror testimony could be used, “the result would be to make what was intended
to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation; to the
destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.”); see also
Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120-21 (explaining that post-verdict scrutiny undermines public
trust in the judicial system).
38
See McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267 (expressing concern that jurors might
manufacture evidence to set aside the verdict).
39
See Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of
Postverdict Interviews, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 295, 314 (noting that if jury
deliberations became public knowledge, “previously anonymous jurors, reaching a
group decision based on ‘community values,’ and lay perspectives, will feel they
must justify it in the court of public opinion.”); see also Diehm, supra note 1, at
394–95.
40
See Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987) (“fruitful
exchange of ideas and impressions among jurors is thought to hinge heavily on some
assurance that what is said in the jury room will not reach a larger audience.”); see
also Diehm, supra note 1, at 400.
41
See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) (“[f]reedom of debate
might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel
that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world.”); see also
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-21 (1987) (noting that “full and frank
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Jury privacy and secrecy may encourage more sensitive jurors to
express their opinions freely by giving them the security that their
views will remain private. 42 Without secret deliberations, jurors will be
less willing to express their views candidly and freely because they
may be concerned that members of their community would learn of
their individual position, which, in turn, could lead to the suppression
of meritorious but unpopular views, or, worse yet, jurors may feel
compelled to render a popular verdict rather than a just verdict. 43
Finally, the community’s trust in the jury system could be undermined
because exposure of jury deliberations could potentially “unravel the
distinctive [irrational] and intuitive ‘genius’ of this lay tribunal,” and
undermine the jury’s role as a final decision maker. 44
C. Early Common Law Exceptions to the Juror
Impeachment Rule
A brief overview of the common law and its underlying policies
prior to the enactment of Rule 606(b) in 1975 will provide the context
needed for this analysis. As previously mentioned, common law
established a rigid rule that jurors, either through testimony or
affidavit, were incompetent to impeach a verdict.45 This rule was
designed to protect jurors in the hope that such protection would breed
a truthful and just verdict. 46 It follows that such a rigid rule may, in

discussion in the jury room” would be undermined if jurors’ views could be
scrutinized after a trial).
42
See id.
43
See Diehm, supra note 1, at 396.
44
See John H. Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. AM. JUD.
SOC’Y 166, 170 (1929) (“The jury and the secrecy of the jury room, are the
indispensable elements in popular justice.”); see also Goldstein, supra note 39, at
314.
45
See McDonald v. Pless 238 U.S. 264, 269 (U.S. 1915); Hyde & Schneider v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347 (U.S. 1912).
46
See id. (recognizing that if “verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned”
could be attacked and set aside on the testimony jurors, jurors would be harassed by
the defeated party in an effort to set aside a verdict).
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fact, deny a fair trial as juror misconduct inevitably occurs because
juries are comprised of imperfect human beings. 47
As the common law developed, it became clear that exceptions
must be made to such a rigid rule. Early exceptions to the juror
impeachment rule took two forms: (1) the Iowa Rule, 48 which
excluded juror testimony about matters that “essentially adhere in the
verdict itself,” but admitted testimony relating to an “independent
fact,” and (2) the Mattox Rule, 49 which permitted jurors to testify to
“external influences” that might have affected the jury’s decision but
not to any “internal influences” relating to the jury’s deliberation
process. 50 A further evaluation of the common law cases reveals that
the Supreme Court continued to apply the external influences of
Mattox, but not the Iowa Rule.
In McDonald v. Pless, 51 the court made clear that, even if jurors
awarded damages that are inconsistent with the jury instructions, the
general rule is that losing litigant cannot use juror testimony to
impeach a jury verdict. In Remmer v. United States, 52 an unnamed
person attempted to bribe a juror, and the juror reported the bribe to
the trial judge before the verdict was returned. 53 The judge informed
47

Dean Sanderford, The Sixth Amendment, Rule 606(b), and the Intrusion into
Jury Deliberations of Religions Principles of Decision, 74 TENN. L. REV. 167, 173
(2007) (“A juror’s reliance on personal beliefs and experiences, while recognized as
one of the great strengths of the jury system, also enhances the risk that the ultimate
decision will be unfaithful to the law and facts of the case.”).
48
Wright v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210-11 (1866) (permitting
testimony that a jury had reached a quotient verdict because this testimony was
objectively verifiable and not based on the jury’s thought processes during the
deliberations.).
49
Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150-51 (1892) (classifying both
outside information provided by a bailiff and newspapers brought into the jury room
as “external influences.”).
50
See id.
51
238 U.S. 264, 269 (U.S. 1915) (Jurors had assessed damages based on the
average of the individual juror’s opinions.); see also Hyde & Schneider v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347 (U.S. 1912)
52
347 U.S. 227 (1954)
53
Id. at 228.
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the prosecutor and called the FBI to investigate, but the defendant was
not informed of the incident until after the trial.54 In reversing the trial
court’s decision, the Court concluded that a hearing was required to
determine whether the bribe involved private communication, contact,
or tampering with a juror. 55
The Court also allowed testimony about the influence of third
parties in both Turner v. Louisiana 56 and Parker v. Gladden. 57 In
Turner, the Court held that the defendant had been denied the right to
an impartial jury trial when two deputy sheriffs, who presented key
testimony for the State during the trial, supervised and socialized with
jurors outside of the courtroom. 58 In Parker, the bailiff responsible for
overseeing the sequestered jurors, told jurors that the “wicked fellow”
was guilty and that if the jury made a mistake, the Supreme Court
would correct it. 59 In both cases, the Court focused on the Sixth
Amendment’s promise of an impartial jury trial and the related
requirement that all evidence considered by the jury be presented
during the trial. 60 The Court underscored the importance of the Sixth
Amendment's right to a jury trial, stating that "at the very least…the
evidence developed against a defendant shall come from the witness

54

Id. (The trial judge did not inform the defendant because the investigation
revealed that the bribe was not credible.)
55
Id. at 229-230 (holding that “any private communication, contact, or
tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending
before the jury . . . presumptively prejudicial.”). The Court was also troubled by ex
parte actions of trial judge and prosecutor. Id.
56
379 U.S. 466 (1965).
57
385 U.S. 363 (1966).
58
Turner, 379 U.S. at 473 (The jurors’ interaction with the sheriffs potentially
prejudiced the jurors by bolstering the credibility of the sheriffs’ testimony, thus
subverting the defendant’s right to challenge the sheriffs’ credibility meaningfully
through cross-examination during the trial.).
59
Parker, 385 U.S. at 364.
60
See id. at 364-65 ("We have followed the undeviating rule that the rights of
confrontation and cross-examination are among the fundamental requirements of a
constitutionally fair trial.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also
Turner, 379 U.S. at 472.
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stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of
the defendant's rights." 61
These common law cases, as reflected by the subsequent
legislative history, provided foreshadowing for what became the
exceptions in Rule 606(b). Accordingly, an outside influence is when
someone or something attempts to sway the jury (such as a bribe or a
threat), thus depriving a defendant of an impartial jury. 62 Whereas
extraneous prejudicial information is akin to “testimonial”63
information introduced without an opportunity for crossexamination. 64 It is also possible that an event could be both an
outside influence and extraneous prejudicial information. 65
D. The Legislative History of Rule 606(b) and the
Subsequent Applications
Adopted in 1975, Rule 606(b) codified both the common law
juror impeachment rule and the exceptions carved out by subsequent
decisions. 66 Its legislative history shows a debate over whether to
adopt the more expansive policy of the Iowa Rule or to adopt the
narrower “external influences” approach. 67 In the preliminary draft of
Rule 606(b), the Supreme Court Advisory Committee allowed juror
61

Turner, 379 U.S. at 472-73 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. ("[I]t
would be blinking reality not to recognize the extreme prejudice inherent in this
continual association throughout the trial between the jurors and these two key
witnesses for the prosecution.").
62
See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-230 (U.S. 1954).
63
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004) (holding that the
Confrontation Clause is a procedural guarantee that the reliability of testimonial
evidence will be tested through the “crucible of cross-examination”).
64
See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (jury learn information
about the case from the newspaper).
65
See Parker, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (information about the defendant’s guilt
came from the bailiff outside of the courtroom).
66
See Diehm, supra note 1, at 413.
67
See id. at 413-14 (providing a detailed explanation of the legislative history);
Tanner, 483 U.S. at 122-25 (same); see also supra Part II. C. (discussing the Iowa
Rule and the Mattox Rule).

439
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/7

12

Reidy: No Jury Rigging in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 2

Spring 2009

testimony as to statements or acts occurring during deliberations and
precluded only testimony concerning the effect that such statements or
acts had on the juror's mind or the decision, but its final draft only
permitted juror testimony on external influences that were brought to
bear upon any juror. 68 Congress was initially split on the different
versions but ultimately enacted the committee’s final draft which
reflects the more restrictive approach to Rule 606(b). 69 The core
pronouncement of the rule closely resembles the early American
common law rule that the losing party cannot, in order to secure a new
trial, use the testimony of jurors to impeach their verdict. 70 The
exceptions, “extraneous prejudicial information” 71 and “outside
influence,” 72 generally track the common law exceptions provided in
Mattox, Remmer, Turner, and Parker. 73
The Court first addressed the application of Rule 606(b) in Tanner
v. United States, 74 where the defendant sought an evidentiary hearing,
claiming that the jury’s alleged drug and alcohol use during the trial
was an outside influence and a violation of the Impartial Jury
Clause. 75 The Court denied relief because the alleged drug and alcohol
use was “internal” to the deliberation process and an evidentiary
hearing would allow inquiry "into the internal processes of the jury." 76
In reaching this conclusion, the Court appeared to adopt the
“external/internal influence test” used by the lower courts that had
applied Rule 606(b). 77 Under this test, an “outside influence” 78 is not
68

Id.
Id.
70
See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269 (U.S. 1915); Hyde & Schneider v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347 (U.S. 1912).
71
FED. RULE. EVID. 606(b)(1).
72
FED. RULE. EVID. 606(b)(2).
73
See Sanderford, supra note 47, at 181.
74
483 U.S. 107 (1987).
75
Id. at 117.
76
Id. at 117, 120.
77
Id. at 127 (recognizing other aspects of the trial process that protect the
defendant's right to an impartial jury, such as voir dire, the ability of jurors to report
69
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on based on whether the influence literally occurred inside or outside
the jury room; rather courts must assess “the nature of the
influence." 79 In other words, courts must evaluate each allegation on a
case-by-case basis to determine whether they should admit juror
testimony. This test recognizes that Rule 606(b) prohibits jurors from
testifying about “internal” influences, but it also recognizes that jurors
may testify about “external” influences. 80 While the Court mainly
addressed outside influences, it did discuss extraneous prejudicial
information.
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN ARREOLA V. CHOUDRY
A. Northern District of Illinois - Judge Kennelly Presiding
In 2003, Gilbert R. Arreola, a prisoner at Hill Correctional Center,
injured his ankle and was taken to the prison infirmary for treatment
where Doctor Mohammed Choudry examined him, diagnosed him
with a sprained ankle, ordered him back to his cell, and scheduled a
follow-up visit in seven to ten days. 81 A few days later, Arreola was
transferred to Cook County Jail, had an x-ray of his ankle taken,
learned that it was broken, and sued Dr. Choudry. 82
During voir dire, potential jurors were asked, "Have you or any
family member ever had a broken or severely sprained ankle, foot, or

any misconduct before the conclusion of the trial, jurors are under oath to uphold the
law, and they are observable by the court, by counsel, and by other jurors).
78
See FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(2).
79
Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117.
80
See id. (explaining that the proper test for allegations of “outside influence”
under Rule 606(b) is for courts to determine the “nature of the influence”).
81
Arreola v. Choudry, 533 F.3d 601, 603 (7th Cir. 2008) cert. denied, 2008
U.S. LEXIS 8576 (2008).
82
Id. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983; Arreola claimed that Dr.
Choudry's, the prison doctor, treatment of his injured ankle was a deliberate
indifference to a medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
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leg?" Juror Laterza, later elected foreperson, answered "no." 83
Fourteen prospective jurors, six of whom sat as jurors during trial,
answered this question affirmatively. 84 Arreola challenged two jurors
for cause based on their personal experiences with ankle sprains
suffered by family members but later withdrew his challenge when
they said that they would be able to put aside those experiences. 85
Following a two day trial, the jury found Dr. Choudry not guilty
and, after the verdict was returned, the parties were permitted to speak
to the jurors. 86 Following conversations between Arreola’s lawyer and
members of the jury, Arreola motioned for a new trial supported by an
affidavit stating that Juror Laterza based the verdict on her personal
experience with an ankle injury and used her experience to influence
other jurors. 87 In particular, Arreola alleged that Laterza “had no
problem believing that Dr. Choudry could press on Arreola's ankle
without finding tenderness.” 88
Based upon this motion, Judge Kennelly investigated further and
coordinated a telephone conversation with Laterza. 89 Prior to this
telephone conversation, he permitted both lawyers to submit questions
for him to ask Laterza, but he rejected questions involving juror
deliberations. 90 Following his telephone interview with Laterza, Judge
Kennelly concluded that a new trial was not warranted because there
was no proof that she lied during voir dire and her previous injury was
not extraneous prejudicial information; thus, no further inquiry was
required. 91
83

Id.
Id.
85
Id. Judge Kennelly asked follow up questions pertaining to ankle injuries to
all that answered affirmatively, each juror that answered affirmatively assured the
judge that they would be impartial if selected to serve.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 603-04
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 605.
84
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B. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Arreola appealed the district court’s refusal to grant a new trial,
arguing that his due process rights were violated and that the court
misapplied the standard for evaluating juror bias. 92 In particular, he
claimed that Laterza was not truthful during voir dire when she did not
reveal her previous ankle injury. 93 In affirming the decision of the
district court, the Seventh Circuit showed significant deference to
Judge Kennelly’s findings of fact. 94
The first issue addressed on appeal was Areola’s due process
claim. 95 Due process requires a jury capable and willing to decide the
case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge to watch for
prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences
when they happen. 96 Contrary to Arreola’s demand, due process does
not require a new trial every time jurors have been placed in a
potentially compromising situation. 97 The court conceded that while
due process may require a hearing to determine if extraneous contacts
had affected the jury’s ability to be fair, a hearing is not required for
pre-existing bias, because pre-existing bias should be discovered
during voir dire. 98 If a hearing was needed, the nature of the hearing
should allow all interested parties to participate and, to some extent,
should include a determination by the trial judge of the circumstances,

92

Id. at 604-05.
Id. at 604.
94
Id. (citing United States v. Medina, 430 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir. 2005)
("[T]here are compelling institutional considerations…in favor of appellate
deference to the trial judge's evaluation of … juror bias.") (citing United States v.
McClinton, 135 F.3d 1178, 1186 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Trial courts have wide discretion
in deciding a motion for a new trial.”)).
95
Id. at 604-06.
96
Id. at 605 (citing Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2004)).
97
Id. (citing Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118, 104 S. Ct. 453 (1983)).
98
Id. at 606 (citing United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 16, 34-35 (1st Cir.
2003) (holding that a juror's notes are an intrinsic influence on a jury's verdict, thus
an evidentiary hearing is not required).
93
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the impact of those circumstances on the jury, and whether or not the
result of those circumstances prejudiced the verdict.99
Deferring to the district court’s findings, the court held that
Laterza's prior experience with an ankle injury was an “intrinsic
influence” and that Rule 606(b) prohibits using the jurors to impeach
the verdict. 100 The court further acknowledged that jurors are expected
to evaluate the evidence presented at trial in light of their own
experiences and common sense when deliberating; however, jurors
may not go beyond the record to develop their own evidence. 101 The
Seventh Circuit held that the trial judge’s post-verdict voir dire
satisfied due process because he investigated “the allegation of bias in
a direct and conscientious manner, keeping in mind that the integrity
of jury proceedings must not be jeopardized by unauthorized
invasions.” 102 Any further inquiry into the jury’s thought processes
concerning deliberations would have violated Rule 606(b); thus, Judge
Kennelly correctly treated the allegation as an "internal matter." 103
IV. QUESTIONS REMAINING AFTER ARREOLA
While the Seventh Circuit correctly held that Laterza’s knowledge
of ankle injuries was not extraneous prejudicial information, it
declined to explain what would qualify as extraneous prejudicial
99

Id. at 604 (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982)).
Id. at 606 (citing Marquez v. City of Albuquerque, 399 F.3d 1216, 1223
(10th Cir. 2005) ("[A] juror's personal experience does not constitute extraneous
prejudicial information."); Peterson v. Wilson, 141 F.3d 573, 577-78 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that juror discussion of personal past experience is not "extrinsic" evidence
that requires a new trial)).
101
Arreola, 533 F.3d at 606 (citing Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159
(7th Cir. 1987) ("We cannot expunge from jury deliberations the subjective opinions
of jurors, their attitudinal expositions, or their philosophies. These involve the very
human elements that constitute one of the strengths of our jury system.")).
102
Id. at 607.
103
Id. citing United States v. Briggs, 291 F.3d 958, 963-64 (7th Cir. 2002)
(holding that post-verdict allegations of juror intimidation during the deliberative
process were not extraneous prejudicial information or an outside influence, thus
under Rule 606(b) neither a hearing nor a new trial was warranted).
100
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information. Additionally, the court declined Arreola’s request for
cross-examination and the ability to call witnesses, but in declining his
request the court cited a Supreme Court case in which an evidentiary
hearing was held. 104 Finally, the court did not set forth a procedural
standard for the district courts to follow when applying Rule 606(b).
This section will attempt to address these issues. Under this proposed
solution, courts must first determine whether information presented is
extraneous prejudicial information under Rule 606(b) by applying a
totality of circumstances test. If it is, this section will then attempt to
provide procedural guidance to determine whether a hearing is
required.
A. Extraneous Prejudicial Information
The exceptions under Rule 606(b) do not apply to every instance
in which a juror considers facts or data outside the record, yet what
qualifies as extraneous prejudicial information is far from clear. While
the language of Rule 606(b) is vague in some contexts, it is fairly clear
that general influences on a verdict, such as values or biases applied
by the individual jurors, are not within the scope of this language
because this is expected of jurors. 105 However, a line is crossed when
they become investigators of the case. 106 In general, courts have
interpreted “extraneous prejudicial information” as evidence that was
not presented at trial and, therefore, not subject to challenge in open

104

Id. at 605 (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)).
See e.g. United States v. O'Brien, 14 F.3d 703, 708 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[I]n
gauging witness credibility and choosing from among competing inferences, jurors
are entitled to take full advantage of their collective experience and common
sense."); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that the
subjective opinions of jurors, their attitudinal expositions, or their philosophies,
including racial biases are not extraneous prejudicial information).
106
See People v. Wadle, 97 P.3d 932 (Colo. 2004) (finding “extraneous
prejudicial information” when a juror conducted an internet search regarding the
drug allegedly taken by the defendant).
105
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court. 107 Accordingly, these courts have permitted juror testimony as
to the jury's consideration of extra-record information derived from
books, newspapers and other public media, court documents, other
objects not in evidence, experiments or investigations, or views of the
relevant scene or premises. 108 Courts have not allowed, on the other
hand, juror testimony as to the effect of security measures taken at
trial, events that took place in open court, intra-jury influences such as
intimidation or harassment, the use by a juror of notes, and other
matters not classifiable as either information or evidence. 109
While the text of Rule 606(b) states that information must be
prejudicial to allow juror testimony, the determination of prejudicial
information is far from clear. 110 In attempting to define “extraneous
prejudicial information,” some courts have distinguished between
“general information,” which is not covered by the exception, and
“specific facts,” which are covered.111 Some courts conflate the two
exceptions of Rule 606(b) and form a hybrid test, referring to both

107

See Sanderford, supra note 47, at 182; Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.
140 (1892) (newspaper article about the case considered by the jury).
108
See 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
6075 (2nd ed. 2009) (synthesizing factors used in lower court decisions).
109
See id.
110
See, e.g., In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207, 215 (6th Cir.
1982) (allowing juror's letter stating that he considered extraneous information about
the case and it effected his decision); United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192 (9th
Cir. 1979) (jurors read a file with highly prejudicial information about the
defendant). But see, e.g., United States v. Paneras, 222 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2000)
(cartoon depicting events at trial drawn by juror was not an extraneous influence);
United States v. Calbas, 821 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the jury’s
consultation telephone directory was not prejudicial information).
111
See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 151 (3rd
1975) (holding that a verdict is not invalid merely because the jurors' generalized
knowledge about the parties, or some other aspect of the case); Morgan v. Woessner,
997 F.2d 1244, 1261 (9th 1993) (“The type of after-acquired information that
potentially taints a jury verdict should be carefully distinguished from the general
knowledge, opinions, feelings and bias that every juror carries into the jury room.”).
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exceptions under the umbrella of “external influences.” 112 One circuit
court has taken the position that extraneous information under Rule
606(b) only applies to matters that could not have been discovered
during voir dire, either because the juror's exposure to extra-record
evidence occurred after voir dire or the juror lied during that
process. 113 Another circuit has made clear that the information must
bear on a fact at issue in the case and anything else is extraneous
prejudicial information. 114
The general knowledge/fact specific test begs the question of what
is “general knowledge” 115 and it has been criticized as vague and
unworkable. 116 The hybrid test fails to recognize that Congress created
two distinct exceptions and while some instances may be both an
outside influence and extraneous prejudicial information, nonetheless,
courts must recognize that there are two different exceptions and two
different analytical frameworks. Finally, the rigid requirement that the
information bear on a fact at issue in the case does not recognize that
jurors may be influenced by other information.
112

See Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 363 (4th Cir. 2006) (“We use the term
"external influence"…to refer to both extraneous prejudicial information and outside
influences.); see also United States v. Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 380 (6th Cir. 2001).
113
See United States v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 73, 75 (8th Cir.1991) (holding that
the trial court did not err in finding that the comments of a juror that she had talked
with an attorney was not extraneous information sufficient to invalidate the verdicts
against the defendant because the juror “did not have any contact with any attorney
during the progress of the case or deliberations, and did not speak with anyone in a
manner inappropriate or inconsistent with proper jury service.”).
114
Robinson, 438 F.3d at 363 n.15 (Under Rule 606(b) “prejudicial” means
that the information bears on a fact at issue in the case otherwise the list of
ingredients on the packs of coffee provided for jurors would be extraneous
prejudicial information because it is ‘extraneous’ to the evidence presented in the
case and because it is ‘information.).
115
Compare Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 780 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
Bible passages used by the jury were “notions of general currency that inform the
moral judgment [of jurors]…”), with Oliver v. Quarterman, 541 F.3d 329, 339 (5th
Cir. 2008) (“when a juror brings a Bible into the deliberations and points out to her
fellow jurors specific passages that describe the very facts at issue in the case, the
juror has crossed an important line.”).
116
See Crump, supra note 29, at 540.
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Because these tests do not appear to be workable for all future
cases, the Seventh Circuit should adopt a “totality of circumstances”
test 117 in determining whether information is extraneous and
prejudicial. The factors the court should consider include: (1) the
importance of the issue to which the information related, (2) the nature
of the information, (3) the strength of the admitted evidence
supporting the verdict, (4) the number of jurors exposed to the
information, (5) when the jury was exposed to the information, (6)
how long the jury discussed these matters during deliberations, (7) the
manner in which the court dealt with the information at trial, (8) and
any other matters which might have a bearing on the effect of the
information or influence on the jury. 118
Application of the totality of circumstances allows courts more
flexibility than any of the aforementioned tests, especially when the
alleged information is a close call. For instance, courts appear split
whether Rule 606(b) authorizes the receipt of testimony that jurors
consulted a Bible during deliberations. 119 The application of these
factors could change the outcome depending upon the unique
circumstances of the case. 120 For example, how the information
reached the jury is critical because a juror’s internal knowledge of the
Bible is less likely to be extraneous. 121 However, just because the
information is “internal” to the juror does not make the information
per se internal to the deliberation process. For example, in Oliver v.
117

Cf. Rogers v. McDorman, 521 F.3d 381, 396 (5th Cir. 2008) (examining the
"totality of circumstances" in determining whether a jury reached a compromise
verdict).
118
See 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
6075 (2nd ed. 2009) (providing a synthesis of factors used in lower court decisions).
119
See Oliver, 541 F.3d at 339 n. 11 (“The Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth,
Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have not spoken on this issue.”).
120
See United States v. Lara-Ramirez, 519 F.3d 76, 89 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting
that there exists no per se rule of the Bible’s effect in the jury room).
121
See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (holding that information
was prejudicial when bailiff provided it to the jury); cf. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S.
127, 149 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing that it is expected of jurors to
uses their past knowledge when deliberating).
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Quarterman the jury consulted a Bible passage with parallel facts to
the underlying case and rendered a death sentence, just as the Bible
proscribed. 122 The Fifth Circuit recognized that the Fourth Circuit’s 123
rigid rule that the information must be about the case could deny a fair
trial if jurors use a jury instruction from Jesus as opposed to the court’s
instruction. 124 While certain passages from the Bible may be
considered common knowledge, others might not. 125 Because these
questions cannot be answered in the abstract, courts must allow for
juror questioning when information, such as the Bible, is used during
deliberations. Thus, a hearing of some type is required.
The totality of circumstance test recognizes that mere allegations
should not be sufficient to ignore the extensive history of juror
incompetency, but it recognizes that the other protections, both before
and during trial, may not be sufficient to assure a fair trial. 126
Therefore, juror testimony should be held incompetent unless it relates
to overt matters that authoritatively inject facts not contained in the

122

541 F.3d at 340 (evaluating the nature of this passage, the court correctly
held that this was extraneous prejudicial information).
123
See Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 363 n.15 (4th Cir. 2006).
124
See Oliver, 541 F.3d at 332 n. 3 (Defendant was on capital trial for murder,
alleging beating the victim to death with end of a gun, and the jurors read and used a
Bible passage from the Book of Number; “And if he smite him with an instrument of
iron, so that he die, he is a murderer: the murderer shall surely be put to death.”).
125 Compare Burch v. Corcoran, 273 F.3d 577, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting
that the certain passages such as “an eye for an eye” are “statements of folk wisdom
or of cultural precepts"), with Oliver, 541 F.3d at 340 (holding that passage used by
jurors paralleled the facts of the case and was not general knowledge because it
taught that capital punishment is appropriate for a person who strikes another over
the head with an object and causes the person's death).
126
See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (U.S. 1987) (discussing
other protections available before and during the trial to ensure a fair trial).
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evidence 127 or principles of decision not within the applicable law, 128
into the jury's deliberation. 129
B. Procedural Issues with Rule 606(b)
Rule 606(b) is silent as to how courts should proceed once a trial
has been completed and juror misconduct is alleged. 130 Prior to the
enactment of Rule 606(b), if a criminal defendant demonstrated that
extraneous information was present during deliberations it was
deemed presumptively prejudicial and the burden shifted to the
government to prove that the information was harmless. 131 Subsequent
to the enactment of Rule 606(b) and the Supreme Court’s
interpretations thereof, trial courts appear split as to whether the
presumption of prejudice still applies. Some courts have held that Rule
606(b) codified the entire common law, including the presumption of
prejudice. Other courts have held that Rule 606(b) created a procedural
change that places an initial burden on the moving party. 132
The presumption of prejudice approach is flawed because it would
create a blueprint for criminal defendants to impeach guilty verdicts if
a mere showing of extraneous prejudicial information shifted the
burden to the government to rebut. Hypothetically, a defendant
accused of a felony could hire someone to “influence” a juror,
127

See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (holding that information
was prejudicial when bailiff provided it to the jury).
128
See Oliver, 541 F.3d 329 (Bible passage commanded death for an act
similar to the facts presented at trial).
129
See Crump, supra note 29, at 540.
130
See FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
131
See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) ("any private
communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during trial
about the matter pending before the jury" is presumptively prejudicial.
132
Compare United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 551 (11th Cir. 1994)
(examining the jury’s use of a dictionary during deliberations under Remmer’s
presumption of prejudice), with United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F. 3d 490, 503
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a juror’s use of a dictionary did not raise a
presumption of prejudice).
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introduce the external influence after the verdict, and the government
would have to rebut the presumption. The government would struggle
to overcome this burden because the text of Rule 606(b) prohibits the
questioning of jurors as to the affect of any such influence. 133 This
defies the notion of a fair and just verdict.
Based on the policies of Rule 606(b) 134 and its subsequent case
law, it appears that the proper procedure is to place an initial burden on
the moving party to show (1) that information was presented to the
jury outside of the courtroom and (2) that a reasonable probability
exists that the information influenced the jury’s verdict. 135 If the
responding party can prove that the information was harmless, then the
court should dismiss the motion and deny any further inquiry. 136 While
this may sound simplistic in the abstract, the cases have proven that
this can be a difficult task because there is a fine line between juror
knowledge and extraneous prejudicial information. 137 There can be no
bright line procedure in every case. However, where the court
conducts an inquiry broad enough to lead it to a reasonable judgment
that there has been no prejudice, it has fulfilled its procedural as well

133

See United States v. Maree, 934 F.2d 196, 201 (9th Cir. 1991)
(distinguishing between testimony concerning a statement and its impact).
134
See supra Part II. B.
135
See United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-16 (1982) for the proposition that Rule 606(b)
created a substantive change in the law, eliminating any presumption of prejudice
and placed a burden on the moving party); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,
127 (U.S. 1987) (“even if Rule 606(b) is interpreted to retain the common-law
exception allowing post-verdict inquiry of juror incompetence…the showing made
by petitioners falls far short of this standard.”(emphasis added)).
136
See United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (2nd Cir.
1970) (“The touchstone of decision…is thus not the mere fact of infiltration of some
molecules of extra-record matter…but the nature of what has been infiltrated and the
probability of prejudice.”).
137
See Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 327 (7th Cir.2005) (deeming a juror's
knowledge from outside sources that the defendant had taken a polygraph test during
the trial to be an external influence).
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as its substantive duty. 138 Ultimately, trial courts must use prudent
discretion in assessing whether further inquiry is required, 139 but they
should proceed cautiously. 140
Even if the jury has been exposed to extraneous prejudicial
information, some courts 141 have held that Rule 606(b) prohibits jurors
from testifying as to the effects on the jury's decision, while other
courts permit such testimony. 142 Some courts are concerned that the
very holding of a hearing will give rise to the risks and problems that
Rule 606(b) contemplates, especially if jurors are called to testify. 143
The only actual prohibition in the rule is the use of a juror’s testimony
as evidence to overturn a verdict or indictment, but after a trial is over,
jurors are free to discuss their deliberations with litigants or the media
without running afoul of Rule 606(b). 144 Moreover, Rule 606(b) does
138

See Smith, 455 U.S. at 215-16; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 561
(2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing evidentiary hearing for habeas corpus).
139
See United States v. Sanders, 962 F.2d 660, 673 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The trial
judge will always be in a better position…to assess the probable reactions of jurors
in a case over which he has presided.").
140
See United States v. Vitale, 459 F.3d 190, 197 (2d Cir. 2006) (instructing
that district courts should be reluctant "to haul jurors in after they have reached a
verdict in order to probe for potential instances of bias, misconduct or extraneous
influences.").
141
See, e.g., McElroy v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 894 F.2d 1504, 1511
(11th Cir. 1990) (Rule 606(b) precluded considering the emotional state of mind of
the distraught juror and the possible effect of her state of mind on that of the other
jurors); Brofford v. Marshall, 751 F.2d 845, 853 (6th Cir. 1985) (juror may be
permitted to give statement that she had preconceptions concerning defendant's guilt,
but she could not be asked the effect those preconceptions had on her verdict).
142
See, e.g., In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207, 215 (6th Cir.
1982)(admitting juror's letter stating that he not only considered extraneous
prejudicial information but that it was a factor in his decision making); Krause v.
Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563, 571 (6th Cir. 1977) (Rule 606(b) does not rule out permitting
jurors to testify as to the effect on their decision of matters properly classifiable as
outside influences).
143
See United States v. Calbas, 821 F.2d 887, 896 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that
the trial court "wisely refrained from allowing the inquiry to become an adversarial
evidentiary hearing, so as to minimize intrusion on the jury's deliberations.").
144
FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
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not impose any sanctions on parties who harass jurors, nor does it
prohibit jurors from divulging details about their deliberations. Thus,
according to these courts, Rule 606(b) can uphold its policies only if
information gained from post-verdict contact with jurors is not used
for any purpose, including the procurement of a hearing.145 While a
full hearing may be the best way to determine the impact of the
alleged information, it is quite possible that a juror who has been
compromised by threats or coercion will persist in the position
induced, thus concealing the fact that he has been threatened or
pressured, and even after a hearing, the court will remain unaware of
the impropriety. 146
C. Hearings under Rule 606(b)
Perhaps the most important issue to be decided in a case where a
party is seeking to impeach a jury verdict is whether a court should
hold a hearing. 147 Litigants can protect their constitutional rights only
if they are permitted to take steps to determine whether any basis for
jury impeachment exists; however, courts have consistently upheld
rules and orders restricting communication between parties and
jurors. 148 Even if the courts were to determine that a “hearing” is
appropriate, the type of hearing is not found within the text of Rule
606(b). 149 The Supreme Court 150 stated that an evidentiary hearing or
a Remmer 151 type of hearing is appropriate once the procedural
145

See Diehm, supra note 1, at 401.
Id.
147
See id. (explaining that the party seeking to impeach the verdict often will
request that the court hold a hearing to determine whether the allegations are wellfounded, but such requests are usually denied).
148
See id. at 405.
149
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-71 (1970) (discussing the
applicability of hearings to various situations and the general requirements of
different hearings); see also Arreola v. Choudry, 533 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2008)
cert. denied, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 8576 (2008) (asking for a “meaningful hearing”).
150
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 210 (1982) (hearing was required by a
New York State law).
151
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-230 (1954).
146
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thresholds have been satisfied. 152 The benefits 153 of a hearing are
obvious because it may be the best method of determining the merits
of the alleged influence on the verdict. 154
In Arreola, Arreola argued that due process required a meaningful
hearing; specifically, he wanted an opportunity for cross-examination,
an opportunity to call witnesses, and he felt that the juror should have
been sworn in before questioning. 155 Contrary to this request, the
Seventh Circuit correctly handled this situation and satisfied all
constitutional challenges while following the text of Rule 606(b)
because the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is the opportunity
to prove actual bias. 156 Both parties were given the opportunity to
participate by asking questions through the filter of the trial judge. 157
Although the trial judge did not ask all the questions presented by
Arreola, due process does not require courts to ask every question to
jurors. 158 Consistent with the demands of the Constitution and the
precedent of the Supreme Court, Rule 606(b) does not demand a
“meaningful hearing” 159 any time juror impartiality is alleged.
Therefore, a hearing is not required per se; rather, trial courts must
determine the circumstances on an ad hoc basis and then determine
whether further inquiry is required. 160
152

Smith, 455 U.S. at 217 (“holding that “determinations [of jury verdict
prejudice] may properly be made at a hearing like that ordered in Remmer” or if
state law requires as in this case).
153
See supra Part II. (discussing policy reasons for not allowing juror
testimony).
154
See Diehm, supra note 1, at 401-402.
155
Arreola v. Choudry, 533 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2008) cert. denied, 2008
U.S. LEXIS 8576 (2008).
156
See Smith, 455 U.S. at 215-16.
157
Arreola, 533 F.3d at 606.
158
United States v. Meader, 118 F. 3d 876, 876, 878-81 (1st Cir. 1997)
(holding that trial courts have no obligation to ask counsel’s specific questions while
conducting a post-verdict voir dire of a juror for potential bias).
159
See Arreloa, 533 F.3d at 605.
160
See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-230 (1954) (court must
“determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not
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V. CONCLUSION
While the Seventh Circuit correctly denied Arreola further relief,
Rule 606(b) has yet to be fully defined by the Seventh Circuit.
Consistent with the authority set forth in this article, the Seventh
Circuit should formally adopt a totality of the circumstances test for
“extraneous prejudicial information.” Since Rule 606(b) is silent on
procedure, the Seventh Circuit should place the initial burden upon the
moving party to show that the extraneous information was prejudicial
to the verdict; the burden would then shift to the responding party to
prove that the information was harmless. Trial courts must allow the
litigants an opportunity to prove juror bias but must exercise discretion
so as not to disturb to underlying policies of Rule 606(b). While there
may be some circumstances where Rule 606(b) must yield to
Constitutional demands, courts should be reluctant to disturb jury
verdicts based on the extensive history behind the rule of juror
impeachment.

[the external influence] was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties
permitted to participate.”).
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